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FALSE CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONIAL 
INJUSTICE 
JENNIFER LACKEY* 
In the criminal justice system, confessions have long been considered 
the gold standard in evidence.  An immediate problem arises for this gold 
standard, however, when the prevalence of false confessions is taken into 
account.  Since 1989, there have been 367 post-conviction DNA exonerations 
in the United States, and 28% of these involved false confessions.  Moreover, 
false confessions involve everything from minor infractions to detailed 
accounts of violent crimes. 
This article takes a close look at false confessions in connection with 
the phenomenon of testimonial injustice.  It argues that false confessions 
provide a unique and compelling challenge to the current conceptual tools 
used to understand this epistemic wrong. In particular, it argues that we 
cannot make sense of the unjust ways in which false confessions function in 
our criminal justice system by focusing exclusively on speakers getting less 
credibility than they deserve.  It concludes that the way we conceive of 
testimonial injustice requires a significant expansion to include what is 
called agential testimonial injustice—where an unwarranted credibility 
excess is afforded to speakers when their epistemic agency has been denied 
or subverted in the obtaining of their testimony.  At the same time, it shows 
that work by legal scholars and social scientists can benefit by viewing the 
practices that produce confessions through the lens of this expanded notion, 
and hence that epistemological tools can shed light on issues with enormous 
moral and practical consequences. 
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In the criminal justice system, confessions have long been considered 
the gold standard in evidence.  Indeed, according to Saul Kassin: 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that confession evidence is perhaps the most 
powerful evidence of guilt admissible in court1—so powerful, in fact, that “the 
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and 
the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained[.]”2 
An immediate problem arises for this gold standard, however, when the 
prevalence of false confessions is taken into account.  “A false confession is 
an admission to a criminal act—usually accompanied by a narrative of how 
and why the crime occurred—that the confessor did not commit.”3  Since 
1989, there have been 367 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United 
 
 1 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 
34 BEHAV. L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 9 (2010) (citation omitted) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 2 Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 9 (citation omitted) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 182 (1986)). 
 3 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
Confessions may be deemed false when: (1) it is later discovered that no crime was committed 
(e.g., the presumed murder victim is found alive, the autopsy on a “shaken baby” reveals a natural 
cause of death); (2) additional evidence shows it was physically impossible for the confessor to 
have committed the crime (e.g., he or she was demonstrably elsewhere at the time or too young to 
have produced the semen found on the victim); (3) the real perpetrator, having no connection to 
the defendant, is apprehended and linked to the crime (e.g., by intimate knowledge of nonpublic 
crime details, ballistics, or physical evidence); or (4) scientific evidence affirmatively establishes 
the confessor’s innocence (e.g., he or she is excluded by DNA test results on semen, blood, hair, 
or saliva). 
Id. 
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States, and 28% of these involved false confessions.4  Moreover, false 
confessions involve everything from minor infractions to detailed accounts 
of violent crimes.  In the largest sample ever studied, Steven Drizin and 
Richard Leo analyzed 125 cases of proven false confessions in the United 
States between 1971 and 2002 and found that 81% occurred in murder cases, 
followed by rape (9%) and arson (3%).5 
In this paper, I take a close look at false confessions in connection with 
the phenomenon of testimonial injustice.  I show that false confessions 
provide a unique and compelling challenge to the current conceptual tools 
used to understand this epistemic wrong.  In particular, I argue that we cannot 
make sense of the unjust ways in which false confessions function in our 
criminal justice system by focusing exclusively on speakers getting less 
credibility than they deserve.6  I conclude that the way we conceive of 
testimonial injustice requires a significant expansion to include what I call 
agential testimonial injustice—where an unwarranted credibility excess is 
afforded to speakers when their epistemic agency has been denied or 
subverted in the obtaining of their testimony.7  At the same time, I show that 
work by legal scholars and social scientists can benefit by viewing the 
practices that produce confessions through the lens of this expanded notion, 
and hence that epistemological tools can shed light on issues with enormous 
moral and practical consequences.8 
I. CAUSES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS 
There are many factors that contribute to people falsely confessing to 
crimes that they did not commit.  Situational factors can significantly impact 
the likelihood of false confessions, including the length of the interrogation, 
sleep deprivation, the presentation of false evidence, and minimization 
 
 4 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, DNA EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: FAST FACTS, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T
7JA-9SKM]. As Saul Kassin notes, however, 
because this sample does not include those false confessions that are disproved before trial, many 
that result in guilty pleas, those in which DNA evidence is not available, those given to minor 
crimes that receive no post-conviction scrutiny, and those in juvenile proceedings that contain 
confidentiality provisions, the cases that are discovered most surely represent the tip of an iceberg. 
Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 5 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA 
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 946 (2004). 
 6 See infra Section III. 
 7 See infra Section III.C. 
 8 See infra Section III. 
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tactics.9  Dispositional factors—such as juvenile status, developmental 
disabilities, and mental illness—can also make false confessions more 
likely.10  And even the very innocence of the suspect can increase the 
probability of a false confession being offered. Let’s examine these briefly 
in turn. 
A. SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
Among situational factors associated with false confessions, the length 
of the interrogation is one of the more significant.  According to cautionary 
advice from Fred Inbau, single interrogation sessions should not exceed three 
to four hours “unless the suspect is showing clear potential for telling the 
truth.”11  Yet Drizin and Leo found that in cases of false confessions in which 
interrogation time was recorded, 34% lasted six to twelve hours, 39% lasted 
twelve to twenty-four hours, and the average length was 16.3 hours.12  
Moreover, lengthy interrogations are often accompanied by other factors that 
can increase the likelihood of false confessions, such as isolation from 
significant others, which “constitutes a form of deprivation that can heighten 
a suspect’s distress and incentive to remove himself or herself from the 
situation,”13 and sleep deprivation, which “strongly impairs human 
functioning.”14 
Regarding false evidence, it is permissible in the United States for police 
to lie to suspects.15  Therefore, when involvement in criminal activity is 
denied, purportedly decisive evidence of guilt can be offered in response.  
Consider, for instance, the case of Marty Tankleff who, in 1989, was accused 
at the age of seventeen of murdering his parents, “despite the complete 
absence of evidence against him.” 16 
Tankleff vehemently denied the charges for several hours—until his interrogator told 
him that his hair was found within his mother’s grasp, that a “humidity test” indicated 
he had showered (hence, the presence of only one spot of blood on his shoulder), and 
that his hospitalized father had emerged from his coma to say that Marty was his 
 
 9 These factors are highlighted in Saul Kassin’s article because of the “consistency in 
which they appear in cases involving proven false confessions.” Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 
16. 
 10 See infra Section I.B. 
 11 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 206 (5th ed. 2013). 
 12 Drizin & Leo, supra note 5, at 948. 
 13 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 16. 
 14 June J. Pilcher & Allen I. Huffcutt, Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Performance: A 
Meta-Analysis, 19 SLEEP 318, 318 (1996). 
 15 See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). 
 16 Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
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assailant—all of which were untrue (the father never regained consciousness and died 
shortly thereafter).17 
Following these lies, Tankleff became disoriented and confessed, but then 
immediately recanted.18  On the basis of that confession alone, Tankleff was 
convicted, and it was not until nineteen years later that his conviction was 
vacated, and the charges were dismissed.19  That the presentation of false 
evidence contributes to such confessions is reinforced by self-report studies, 
where suspects say that the reason they confessed is that they took themselves 
to be trapped by the weight of the evidence against them.20 
Minimization tactics can also lead to false confessions.21  Such 
techniques come in three different forms: “those that minimize the moral 
consequences of confessing, those that minimize the psychological 
consequences of confessing, and those that minimize the legal consequences 
of confessing.”22  For instance, the interrogator may offer sympathy and 
understanding to normalize the crime, saying, for instance, “I would have 
done the same thing;” the interrogator might offer minimizing explanations 
of the crime, such as that the murder was spontaneous or accidental; and the 
interrogator might communicate promises through pragmatic implication 
that the suspect will be punished less severely if he or she confesses.  All 
three forms can put pressure of varying degrees on a suspect to confess to a 
crime that he or she did not commit, especially when used in combination 
 
 17 Id. at 17–18. 
 18 See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for 
Reform, 1(1) POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM THE BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 112, 115 (2014). 
 19 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 18 (quoting RICK FIRSTMAN & JAY SALPETER, A CRIMINAL 
INJUSTICE: A TRUE CRIME, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE FIGHT TO FREE MARTY TANKLEFF 
326–27, 562 (2008)); see also Bruce Lambert, Freed After 17 Years in Prison, L.I. Man Will 
Not Face New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at B1. 
 20 See Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, The Gudjonsson Confession 
Questionnaire-Revised (GCQ-R): Factor Structure and its Relationship with Personality, 27 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 953, 954 (1999); Stephen Moston et al., The Effects 
of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Police Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 23, 38 (1992). 
 21 See Jessica R. Klaver et al., Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques and 
Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 71, 
81 (2008). 
 22 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 30 (citing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 244, 247 (4th ed. 2001)); see also Richard J. Ofshe & 
Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 
DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 999, 1054–56, 1098–1104 (1997); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, 
The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and 
False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC’Y. 189, 192–93, 227 (1997). 
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with some of the other techniques, such as the presentation of false 
evidence.23 
B. DISPOSITIONAL FACTORS 
In addition to situational features, there are dispositional factors that 
increase the likelihood of false confessions, and the two most commonly 
cited concerns are juvenile status and mental impairment, including 
developmental disabilities and mental illness.  This is supported by the fact 
that these groups are wildly overrepresented in the population of proven false 
confessions.  “For example, of the first 200 DNA exonerations in the U.S., 
35% of the false confessors were 18 years or younger and/or had a 
developmental disability.”24  In their sample of wrongful convictions, Samuel 
Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery, and Sujata 
Patil found that 42% of the exonerated juveniles and 69% of exonerated 
persons with mental disabilities were wrongly convicted because of false 
confessions.25  There are a number of factors at work here.   In both groups, 
for instance, there can be impairments in adjudicative competence, such as 
the ability to assist in one’s own defense.  There can also be a diminished 
capacity to grasp legal terms, such as Miranda rights.26 
C. INNOCENCE 
Finally, false confessions are often facilitated by the very innocence of 
the suspect.  Awareness of one’s own innocence leads people not only to 
waive their Miranda rights to silence and to counsel,27 but also to be more 
open and forthcoming in their interactions with police.28  If you have nothing 
to hide, you might wonder why you should remain silent and get an attorney.  
Yet it is not uncommon for the testimony of those who are innocent to be 
used against them, such as by calling into question their reliability or sincerity 
on the basis of minor inaccuracies.29  In addition, when a suspect confesses, 
 
 23 False confessions are an example of what Rachel McKinney calls “extracted speech.” 
Rachel Ann McKinney, Extracted Speech, 42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 258, 259 (2016). 
 24 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 19. 
 25 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005). 
 26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 27 See Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: 
The Power of Innocence, 28 BEHAV. L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 218 (2004). 
 28 See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents 
at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 218 (2005). 
 29 See Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2011) (“[T]ruthful responses of an innocent 
witness . . . may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s own 
mouth.”). 
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this often leads the police to regard the case as solved, thereby closing the 
investigation and increasing the likelihood of overlooking exculpatory 
evidence.30 
II. TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE 
With these points in mind, let’s now take a closer look at the 
phenomenon of testimonial injustice.  The standard view is that a speaker is 
a victim of testimonial injustice when she is afforded a credibility deficit in 
virtue of a prejudice on the part of a hearer that targets her social identity.31 
A credibility deficit occurs when a hearer affords less credibility to a 
speaker than is warranted by the evidence that the speaker is offering the 
truth.  A hearer has the relevant kind of identity prejudice when she has a 
prejudice against the speaker in virtue of the latter’s membership in a certain 
social group.32  Prejudice in the context of testimonial injustice is understood 
in terms of not being properly responsive to evidence.  A prejudicial 
stereotype, for instance, is a generalization about a social group that fails to 
be sufficiently sensitive to relevant evidence.33  Where this prejudice “tracks” 
the subject through different dimensions of social activity—economic, 
educational, professional, and so on—it is systematic, and the type that tracks 
people in this way is related to social identity, such as racial and gender 
identity.  For instance, if a police officer rejects a woman’s report of sexual 
assault merely because his sexism leads to him discrediting her, and despite 
evidence that she is being truthful, this would be a paradigmatic instance of 
testimonial injustice.  In particular, the police officer’s sexist beliefs manifest 
 
 30 Richard A. Leo and & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 440–41 (1998). 
 31 See, e.g., MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 
28 (2007). According to Fricker, “[A] speaker sustains . . . testimonial injustice if and only if 
she receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer; so the central case 
of testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 32 But cf. Elizabeth Anderson, Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, 26 SOC. 
EPISTEMOLOGY 163 (2012) (identifying structural epistemic injustices, Anderson argues that 
some instances of testimonial injustice may have locally, non-prejudicial causes and require 
structural remedies). I am convinced by Anderson’s arguments, and hence I do not think that 
all instances of testimonial injustice require a local, prejudicial origin. Nevertheless, I will, for 
the most part, grant this aspect of Fricker’s view in what follows. 
 33 FRICKER, supra note 31, at 34. According to Fricker, the prejudicial stereotypes that are 
relevant to testimonial injustice are those that also (i) have a negative valence, and (ii) stem 
from an “ethically noxious” motivation. Id. Both (i) and (ii) have been challenged on both 
empirical and philosophical grounds. See, e.g., Wade Munroe, Testimonial Injustice and 
Prescriptive Credibility Deficits, 46 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 924, 924 (2016). I will not focus on 
these stereotypes in what follows. 
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as a prejudice that targets the victim’s gender identity in a way that causes 
her testimony to be regarded as less credible than the evidence supports.34 
Miranda Fricker argues that when a hearer gives a speaker a credibility 
deficit because of her social identity, the speaker is wronged “in her capacity 
as a knower,” and is thereby the victim of testimonial injustice.35  For the 
purposes of this paper, I will focus entirely on Fricker’s claim that only 
credibility deficits are relevant to this phenomenon, which is a claim that I 
will later challenge.  Here, Fricker explicitly considers the question of 
whether credibility excesses can result in testimonial injustice, and denies 
that they can be, at least in the paradigmatic sense that is of interest to her.36  
She writes: 
On the face of it, one might think that both credibility deficit and credibility excess are 
cases of testimonial injustice. Certainly there is a sense of ‘injustice’ that might 
naturally and quite properly be applied to cases of credibility excess, as when one might 
complain at the injustice of someone receiving unduly high credibility in what he said 
just because he spoke with a certain accent. At a stretch, this could be cast as a case of 
injustice as distributive unfairness—someone has got more than his fair share of a 
good—but that would be straining the idiom, for credibility is not a good that belongs 
with the distributive model of justice . . . those goods best suited to the distributive 
model are so suited principally because they are finite and at least potentially in short 
supply . . . . Such goods are those for which there is, or may soon be, a certain 
competition, and that is what gives rise to the ethical puzzle about the justice of this or 
that particular distribution. By contrast, credibility is not generally finite in this way, 
and so there is no analogous competitive demand to invite the distributive treatment.37 
 
 34 See also Kristie Dotson, Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing, 
26 HYPATIA 236, 242 (2011) (citing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 69, 
72–81 (2000)). Drawing on work by Patricia Hill Collins, Kristie Dotson focuses on a 
phenomenon very similar to testimonial injustice that she calls “testimonial quieting,” which 
“occurs when an audience fails to identify a speaker as a knower.” Id. She writes: 
A speaker needs an audience to identify, or at least recognize, her as a knower in order to offer 
testimony. This kind of testimonial oppression has long been discussed in the work of women of 
color. Take as an example a popular analysis of black women’s lack of credibility found in the 
work of Patricia Hill Collins. Collins claims that by virtue of her being a U.S. black woman she 
will systematically be undervalued as a knower. This undervaluing is a way in which Collins and 
other black women’s dependencies as speakers are not being met. To undervalue a black woman 
speaker is to take her status as a knower to be less than plausible. One of Collins’s claims is that 
black women are less likely to be considered competent due to an audience’s inability to discern 
the possession of credibility beyond “controlling images” that stigmatize black women as a group.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 35 FRICKER, supra note 31, at 20. 
 36 Id. at 19–20. 
 37 Id. 
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Fricker grounds her denial that credibility excesses can lead to testimonial 
injustice in her rejection of a distributive model of credibility.38  In particular, 
she argues that credibility is not finite in a way that lends itself to a 
distributive treatment.39  Consider, for instance, finite goods, such as wealth, 
land, or food.  Not everyone can own twenty acres because there is only a 
limited amount of land to go around.  For some to have a lot of it necessitates 
that others have a little, or none at all.  But other goods don’t limit one another 
in this way.  To give moral praise to one person need not be to deny it to 
another.  We can say equally of Abraham Lincoln, Ida B. Wells, and Martin 
Luther King Jr. that they are exceptional moral agents.  In this way, there is 
an important sense in which moral praise is an infinite good: there is often 
enough of it to go around. 
Credibility, according to Fricker, is like moral praise rather than like 
land: it is an infinite good.40  If two friends tell me about their vacations this 
summer, believing that one of them snorkeled in Thailand need not impact 
my trusting that the other went hiking in Peru.  I can give them both as much 
credibility as I like since not only is there plenty to go around, but giving 
some of it to one need not take any away from the other.  Because of this, 
Fricker’s view is that it is not unjust to give someone more credibility than is 
owed since this doesn’t deprive someone else of a good that is deserved.41 
 
 38 See also José Medina, The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of 
Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary, 25 SOC. 
EPISTEMOLOGY 15, 19 (2011). According to Medina, “Credibility is indeed not a finite good 
that can be in danger of becoming scarce in the same way that food and water can . . . .” Id. 
Similarly, he writes: 
The credibility excess assigned to some can be correlated to the credibility deficits assigned to 
others not because credibility is a scarce good (as the distributive model wrongly assumes), but 
because credibility is a comparative and contrastive quality, and an excessive attribution of it 
involves the privileged epistemic treatment of some (the members of the comparison class, i.e. 
those like the recipient) and the underprivileged epistemic treatment of others (the members of the 
contrast class, i.e. those unlike the recipient). An excessive attribution of credibility indirectly 
affects others who are, implicitly, unfairly treated as enjoying comparatively less epistemic trust. 
In my view, this is due to a disproportion in credibility and authority assigned to members of 
different groups. Credibility is not a scarce good that should be distributed with equal shares, but 
excesses and deficits are to be assessed by comparison with what is deemed a normal epistemic 
subject. 
Id. at 20. 
 39 See, e.g., FRICKER, supra note 31, at 19. Fricker argues that credibility is a concept that 
“wears its proper distribution on its sleeve.” Id. For an argument against this, see Jennifer 
Lackey, Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods, in BELIEVING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE EVIDENCE: NEW ESSAYS ON EVIDENTIALISM (Kevin McCain ed., 2018) (arguing that 
in many cases where credibility is finite, a distributive model is appropriate). 
 40 FRICKER, supra note 31, at 19–20. 
 41 Id. 
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III. CREDIBILITY EXCESSES, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND AGENTIAL 
TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE 
I began this paper by highlighting that the U.S. Supreme Court regards 
confession evidence as possibly the most powerful evidence of guilt 
admissible in court.42  Yet we have seen that confessions are often acquired 
through coercion, manipulation, and deception, such as by presenting false 
evidence and using minimization tactics.43  Vulnerable subjects, such as 
those who have been sleep deprived, juveniles, and the mentally impaired, 
are also frequently involved in the obtaining of false confessions.44  What I 
now want to show is that when the testimony of a confessing self is privileged 
over a recanting self because of prejudice, whether racial or otherwise, a 
unique kind of testimonial injustice results that is due to a credibility excess.45  
This can be seen most clearly by focusing on several features of false 
confessions. 
A. RESISTANCE TO COUNTEREVIDENCE 
First, false confessions are highly resistant to counterevidence, which is 
a key feature of the prejudicial stereotypes often at work in instances of 
testimonial injustice.  Despite awareness of the reality and prevalence of false 
confessions, as well as their causes and effects, false confessions are 
frequently taken to be sufficient grounding for convictions.46  This occurs 
even when there is powerful evidence on behalf of defendants’ innocence in 
particular cases and when the stakes simply couldn’t be higher.47  In a recent 
article showing how false confessions trump exculpatory DNA evidence, for 
instance, Sarah Appleby and Saul Kassin discuss the case of Juan Rivera, 
who was convicted of the rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl in 
Waukegan, Illinois on the basis of his confession, even after DNA testing of 
 
 42 See Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 9. 
 43 See supra Section I. 
 44 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 16. 
 45 See generally Emmalon Davis, Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for 
Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice, 31 HYPATIA 485 (2016) (showing that typecasting, 
compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation credibility excesses may result in 
testimonial injustice); Medina, supra note 38 (arguing that as belief is apportioned in accord 
with credibility relative to others in a testimonial context, credibility excess may give rise to 
testimonial injustice). Both Medina and Davis discuss the relationship between credibility 
excesses and testimonial injustice, but neither does so in relation to phenomena at all like false 
confessions. 
 46 See infra pp. 53–54. 
 47 See infra pp. 53–54. 
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semen at the scene excluded him.48  “The state’s theory of why DNA 
belonging to someone other than the defendant was found in the victim was 
that the young girl had prior consensual sex with an unknown male, after 
which time Rivera raped her, failed to ejaculate, and then killed her.”49  The 
fact that Rivera was convicted of the child’s murder shows that the state’s 
outrageous theory50 was regarded by the jury as more credible than the 
possibility that he confessed to a crime he didn’t commit.51  In other words, 
a single confession trumped evidence that would otherwise be taken to be 
decisively exculpatory.  The most plausible explanation for this is that the 
false confession received a massive, unwarranted excess of credibility. 
This is even more vivid when it is noticed that the totality of the 
evidence against confessions is often substantial, while the evidence in their 
favor is remarkably thin.  Returning to the case of Juan Rivera, the evidence 
in favor of his innocence wasn’t only the DNA that excluded him, but also 
the fact that the state needed to construct an incredible theory to explain 
 
 48 Sarah C. Appleby & Saul M. Kassin, When Self-Report Trumps Science: Effects of 
Confessions, DNA, and Prosecutorial Theories on Perceptions of Guilt, 22 PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL’Y, AND L. 127, 127 (2016). 
 49 Id. 
 50 As Jacqueline McMurtrie notes, “The unnamed-lover theory is used so often by 
prosecutors that it has its own moniker: ‘the unindicted co-ejaculator.’” Jacqueline McMurtrie, 
The Unindicted Co-Ejaculator and Necrophilia: Addressing Prosecutors’ Logic-Defying 
Responses to Exculpatory DNA Result, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853, 855 (2015). 
 51 I should note that this is not an isolated or anomalous occurrence. Here is another 
equally outrageous example: 
[In] [t]he 2004 case of South Carolina against Billy Wayne Cope . . . . Cope woke up one morning 
to find his 12-year-old daughter strangled to death in her bed. Police identified Cope as the 
perpetrator and interrogated him for several stressful hours during which time they told him that 
he failed a lie detector test and used other interrogation tactics that put innocent people at risk. 
After 2.5 days, Cope eventually confessed in a statement that was filled with contradictions and 
factual errors. Shortly thereafter, it was revealed that Cope’s daughter was also sexually assaulted. 
Subsequent DNA tests revealed that the semen and saliva found on the girl’s body did not match 
Cope, but it did match James Sanders, a serial sex offender who had broken into other homes in 
the area as well. One would think from this series of events that Cope would have been released 
from jail, freed, and compensated. Instead, however, the prosecutor—armed with a police-induced 
confession that did not match the facts of the crime and with no evidence of a link between the 
two men—charged Cope with conspiracy and theorized that he had pimped his daughter out to 
Sanders. On the basis of this theory, the jury convicted both Cope and Sanders. Cope’s conviction 
was recently affirmed at the state level; in 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant Cope’s 
request for an appeal.  
Appleby & Kassin, supra note 48, at 129 (citations omitted). Moreover, in 2010, the Center 
on Wrongful Convictions “identified 19 cases in which confessors to rape and/or murder were 
tried and convicted despite having been excluded by DNA tests of key biological materials.” 
Id. at 128.  
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this.52  He was also a nineteen-year-old former special education student, who 
had been questioned by detectives for four days, during which he steadfastly 
denied any knowledge of the crime.53  Around midnight on the fourth day, 
after the interrogators became accusatory: 
He broke down, and purportedly nodded when asked if he had raped and killed [the 
eleven-year-old girl]. The interrogation continued until 3:00 a.m., when investigators 
left to type a confession for Rivera to sign. Minutes later, jail personnel saw him beating 
his head against the wall of his cell in what was later termed a psychotic episode. 
Nevertheless, within a few hours, Rivera signed the typed confession that the 
investigators had prepared. The document, a narrative account of what the investigators 
claimed Rivera told them, was so riddled with incorrect and implausible information, 
that Lake County State’s Attorney Michael Waller instructed investigators to resume 
the interrogation in an effort to clear up the inconsistencies. On October 30, despite 
Rivera’s obvious fragile mental condition, the interrogation resumed, resulting in a 
second signed confession, which contained a plausible account of the crime.54 
Because of trial errors and post-conviction DNA testing, Rivera had three 
separate jury trials and was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison on all 
three occasions.55  It wasn’t until the Center on Wrongful Convictions 
became involved that the Illinois Appellate Court ruled in 2012 that Rivera’s 
conviction was “unjustified and cannot stand,” and thus that the state would 
dismiss all charges.56  Rivera had served nineteen years in prison.57 
If we look at the case of Rivera, the extent to which his false confession 
was given an excess of credibility is not only undeniable, it is shocking.  To 
see this, notice that knowledge is taken to be incompatible with the presence 
of different kinds of counterevidence called defeaters, which can be either 
doxastic or normative, and either rebutting or undercutting.58  A doxastic 
 
 52 Juan Rivera Time Served: 19 Years, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, [hereinafter Rivera Time 
Served], https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/juan-rivera [https://perma.cc/FY62-FM3S]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 57 Id. 
 58 There are various views of defeaters, approached in a number of different ways. See 
generally ROBERT AUDI, EPISTEMOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE (1998); LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1985); LAURENCE BONJOUR & ERNEST SOSA, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION: INTERNALISM VS. 
EXTERNALISM, FOUNDATIONS VS. VIRTUES (2003); RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF 
KNOWLEDGE (3rd ed. 1989); ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986); 
JOHN HAWTHORNE, KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2004); JENNIFER LACKEY, LEARNING FROM 
WORDS: TESTIMONY AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE (2008); John McDowell, Knowledge by 
Hearsay, in KNOWING FROM WORDS 195 (Bimal Krishna Matilal & Arindam Chakrabarti eds., 
1994); ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND PROPER FUNCTION (1993); JOHN POLLOCK, 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE (1986); MICHAEL WILLIAMS, GROUNDLESS 
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defeater is a doubt or belief that you have that indicates that one of your 
beliefs is either false (i.e., rebutting) or unreliably formed or sustained (i.e., 
undercutting).  A normative defeater is similar, except it concerns doubts or 
beliefs that you should have, given the evidence available to you.  So, for 
example, if I believe that the animal in my backyard is a bobcat by seeing 
one there, I might get powerful evidence that such a belief is false by you 
telling me that bobcats have never lived in my state, or that my basis is a poor 
one by my optometrist reporting to me how much my vision has deteriorated.  
If I accept both instances of testimony, then I have doxastic defeaters, 
rebutting in the first case, undercutting in the second. But even if I doubt or 
deny the testimony in question, I am still responsible for this counterevidence 
if I reject it for no good reason at all.  Why?  Because it is evidence that I 
should have.59  The justification that my bobcat belief might have initially 
enjoyed, then, has been normatively defeated. 
These tools can help us see the extent to which Rivera’s false confession 
was given a massive excess of credibility over the course of decades and by 
people at every stage of the process—including police officers, prosecutors, 
and jurors—that resulted in a distinct form of testimonial injustice.  Given all 
of the research discussed above, Rivera was, first and foremost, a prime 
candidate for providing a false confession: he was a special education student 
who had endured multiple lengthy interrogations, was sleep-deprived, and 
was shown to be in the middle of a psychotic episode.60  Moreover, Rivera’s 
original confession was riddled with inaccuracies and implausible 
information.61  All of this, by itself, should challenge the reliability of Rivera 
as a source of information about his guilt.  In other words, those accepting 
Rivera’s confession had undercutting defeaters (whether doxastic or 
normative), since they had evidence that clearly showed that their beliefs that 
Rivera raped and murdered the eleven-year-old child were unreliably formed 
or sustained.  That is, they had evidence that the source of their beliefs about 
 
BELIEF: AN ESSAY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY (2nd ed. 1999); Robert Audi, The 
Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, 34 AM. PHIL. Q. 405 (1997); 
Michael Bergmann, Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition 110 SYNTHESE 
399 (1997); Laurence BonJour, Externalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, 5 MIDWEST 
STUD. IN PHIL. 53 (1980); Tyler Burge, Content Preservation, 102 PHIL. REV. 457 (1993); 
Tyler Burge, Interlocution, Perception, and Memory, 86 PHIL. STUD. 21 (1997); Elizabeth 
Fricker, Against Gullibility, in KNOWING FROM WORDS 125 (Bimal Krishna Matilal & 
Arindam Chakrabarti eds., 1994); Elizabeth Fricker, The Epistemology of Testimony, Supp. 
Vol. 61 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 57 (1987); Baron Reed, Epistemic Circularity 
Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense, 73 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 186 (2006). 
 59 See Sanford Goldberg, Should Have Known, 194 SYNTHESE 2863 (2015) (providing 
development of the notion of should have known). 
 60 Rivera Time Served, supra note 52. 
 61 Id. 
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Rivera’s guilt—namely, Rivera himself—was not reliable under the 
interrogation conditions in question.  But they also had doxastic rebutting 
defeaters since the DNA evidence excluded him as a source of the semen at 
the scene of the crime, thereby calling into question the truth of their beliefs 
that he was guilty of the crimes. 
When one has a defeater of any kind, the only way in which the target 
belief can be rationally retained is if one has a defeater-defeater—that is, a 
further belief or evidence that defeats the original belief or evidence.62  So, 
for instance, the rebutting defeater for my bobcat belief might itself be 
defeated if I come to learn that a bobcat recently escaped from the local zoo.  
Or the undercutting defeater might be defeated if I discover that my 
optometrist consulted the wrong chart when concluding that my vision is 
unreliable.  But notice: there is simply no way in which the State’s incredible 
theory in which the eleven-year-old was sexually active with some unknown 
male, and Rivera didn’t ejaculate despite raping her, successfully works as a 
defeater-defeater here.  In other words, there is no interpretation of the 
available evidence that makes this theory more plausible than the alternative 
one: namely, that Rivera falsely confessed under duress to a crime he didn’t 
commit. 
That false confessions are resistant to counterevidence is further 
supported by looking at the sheer number of instances of testimony that often 
need to be discounted in order to retain belief in the correctness of a 
corresponding conviction.  Consider, for analogy, how the testimony of 
victims of sexual assault is often rejected or discounted because of bias or 
prejudice,63 but how numbers can sometimes add up to tip the balance.64  So, 
for instance, a handful of girls and women accusing Larry Nassar of sexual 
harassment or assault wasn’t enough for many to believe them, but when over 
300 women came forward, the public started to side with their word over his 
denials.65  We saw something similar in the case of Bill Cosby, where sixty 
 
 62 LACKEY, supra note 58. 
 63 See e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility 
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2017) (discussing credibility discounting as actionable 
discrimination). 
 64 It is instructive to compare this point to Charles Mills’ discussion of the testimony of 
blacks: “At one point in German South-West Africa, white settlers demanded ‘that in court 
only the testimony of seven African witnesses could outweigh evidence presented by a single 
white person.’” Charles Mills, White Ignorance, in RACE AND EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE 
11, 32 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007) (quoting MARK COCKER, RIVERS OF 
BLOOD, RIVERS OF GOLD: EUROPE’S CONFLICT WITH TRIBAL PEOPLES 317 (1998)). 
 65 David Eggert & Ed White, Michigan State Reaches $500M Settlement for 332 Victims 
of Larry Nassar, CHI. TRIB. (May 16, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/
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women reported being victimized at the hands of the once respected 
comedian and actor.66  Now while this involves the addition of new testifiers, 
we can see a structurally similar problem at work in false confessions.  A 
confessing self often reports guilt only once—under conditions of coercion, 
manipulation, deception, sleep deprivation, stress, and so on—while a 
recanting self reports innocence hundreds, even thousands of times, often 
over a period of years.  And yet despite this, the one report of guilt utterly 
swamps the thousands of reports of innocence, with no justification for this 
radical asymmetry in treatment of confession versus recantations.  This 
provides another lens through which we can see that false confessions are 




 66 Carly Mallenbaum et al., A Complete List of the 60 Bill Cosby Accusers and Their 
Reactions to His Prison Sentence, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/life/people/2018/04/27/bill-cosby-full-list-accusers/555144002/ [https://perma.cc/5MQ
T-3MW5].  
 67 While cases involving false confessions raise unique and interesting issues, related 
concerns arise when an accusing self receives a credibility excess, while a recanting self 
receives a credibility deficit. For instance, when a witness provides testimony that accuses a 
defendant of a crime, it is often massively privileged over a later recantation, even when the 
original accusation is the sole or primary evidence on behalf of guilt and the recantation is 
supported by corroborating evidence. Christopher J. Sinnott, When Defendant Becomes the 
Victim: A Child’s Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 569, 574–
78 (1993) [hereinafter Sinnott, When Defendant Becomes the Victim]; see also Shawn 
Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses: Why the Red-Headed Stepchild of New 
Evidence Deserves Another Look, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 75, 75 (2008) [hereinafter 
Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses]. Legal scholars have noted the credibility 
deficit attached to recanting testimony, pointing to a general judicial skepticism that “has 
become so universal that it appears to have given rise to an inference that recantation evidence 
is not trustworthy and should be treated as such absent the movant’s ability to persuade 
otherwise” Sinnott, When Defendant Becomes the Victim at 574–75 (1993). This is supported 
by the fact that the recantation of testimony of key witnesses is widely disregarded by courts, 
with the view of the Court of Appeals of New York in 1916 often cited by way of support: 
“There is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony. In the popular mind it is often 
regarded as of great importance. Those experienced in the administration of the criminal law 
know well its untrustworthy character.” People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 736 (N.Y. 1916); 
see Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses at 75. 
 However, the very reasons revealing that this suspicion regarding recantation testimony 
involves an unwarranted credibility deficit also point toward the illegitimate credibility excess 
that the accusing testimony receives. To see this, the first point to note is that most of the 
considerations on behalf of discounting recantations cut both ways and provide no reason for 
a general preference for the original testimony of accusing selves. For instance, (1) 
recantations are thought to reveal the untrustworthiness of the witness; (2) fears are expressed 
that the witness has recanted under duress or because of coercion; (3) close relationships 
between defendants and witnesses are cited as reason for skepticism; and (4) worries about 
the court being manipulated are expressed. Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses at 
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B. FINITE NATURE OF CREDIBILITY 
Second, false confessions reveal how credibility can be finite and thus 
how its proper distribution is crucial for assessing whether a speaker is the 
victim of testimonial injustice.  Typically, when we talk about distributing 
credibility, we have in mind doing so across different people.  If a woman 
says she was assaulted and the accused assailant denies this, then the question 
is: which person do we believe?  But in cases of false confessions, we are 
 
82. While Armbrust discusses three other reasons why recantations are discounted, none 
support the radical asymmetrical treatment of accusations and recantations by courts. Id. at 
83–87. But notice that each of these could equally be invoked to call into question the 
reliability of the accusation in the first place. If providing inconsistent testimony, for instance, 
undermines the witness’s credibility, this does not favor the earlier time over the later one. 
Moreover, at the original trial, witnesses can testify under duress or because of coercion, can 
have a close relationship with the defendant, and can be manipulating the court. To the extent 
that these considerations raise concerns about reliability, accusations and recantations should 
be in the same boat. Yet courts systematically treat them not only differently, but radically so. 
Id. at 78. 
 Further support on behalf of the claim that accusations receive an unwarranted credibility 
excess can be seen by highlighting that accusations are preferred, even when the original 
testimony is offered by vulnerable witnesses prone to fear or intimidation, and their later adult 
selves recant with very plausible explanations for why they were dishonest in the first place. 
Id. at 95–96. For instance, in a very well-known case, Cathleen Crowell Webb, at the age of 
sixteen, accused Gary Dotson in 1977 of abducting and raping her. Id. at 75–76. Eight years 
later, while married and riddled with guilt, she recanted her testimony, admitting that she 
fabricated the accusation out of fear of a possible pregnancy at that time. Id. at 76. Despite her 
maturation, and the very plausible explanation of the unreliability of her original testimony, 
the judge found that Webb’s trial testimony was more credible than her recantation at an 
evidentiary hearing that Dotson requested. Id. Eventually, in 1989, Dotson became the first 
person in the United States to be exonerated on the basis of DNA evidence. Id. at 76–77. One 
way to understand why an accusation of a frightened juvenile was massively privileged over 
that of a secure, adult woman—especially when a man’s freedom was on the line—is that the 
accusing self was given an unwarranted credibility excess. 
 That such credibility excesses are resistant to evidence is made vivid by considering the 
following statement by Judge Seabury in Shilitano, challenging recantations: 
Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a low and degraded character 
and that after they have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other 
improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule which left the power to grant 
a new trial to a defendant to depend upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of 
the proper administration of justice. 
112 N.E. at 735. There are at least two problems with what Judge Seabury says in this passage: 
first, the wholesale rejection of recantations seems to be driven by prejudice regarding 
witnesses to crimes of violence, whom he describes as having a “low and degraded character.” 
Id. Second, everything that is said here should cut both ways, as (i) the same witnesses offering 
the recantation also provided the original accusing testimony, and (ii) witnesses can similarly 
be subject to bribery and improper considerations at both times. Id. Once again, the most 
plausible explanation for the general and widespread privileging of accusing testimony is that 
courts systematically give it a significant and unwarranted credibility excess. 
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talking about distributing credibility across different times in the life of the 
same person.  There is the earlier, confessing self and the later, recanting self.  
The question then becomes, which self do we believe: the earlier one or the 
later one? 
Of course, the mere fact that two people or selves disagree, even about 
matters of fact, does not by itself require that credibility be finite between 
them.  I may tell you that a local restaurant is open while someone else tells 
you it’s not.  That we offer competing reports here does not require that only 
one of us be deemed worthy of trust or belief: you can be credible, even if 
wrong on a particular occasion, and I can lack credibility, even if right in a 
one-off case.  Many disagreements are the product of innocent mistakes or 
lack of information, and so there can still be enough credibility to go around. 
But not all disagreements are like this.  It’s precisely when someone’s 
credibility itself is on the line that its finitude rears its head.  False confessions 
provide the clearest case here: when someone confesses to murder and then 
recants shortly thereafter, there are no errors or gaps in evidence to explain 
the disagreement away.  To give credibility to the confessing self is ipso 
facto to deny it to the recanting self. Credibility becomes scarce.68  What this 
shows is that false confessions uniquely pit one against oneself, and reveal 
how an excess in credibility can lead to an egregious kind of testimonial 
injustice.69 
C. AGENTIAL TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE 
Third, by virtue of the state saying that the reality described by the 
confessor in cases of false confessions—one that is reported only through 
coercion, manipulation, deception, sleep deprivation, and so on—represents 
her truest self, the confessor’s status as a knower is reduced to what she 
reports only under conditions devoid of, or with diminished, epistemic 
agency.  This is especially problematic since the question of whether one is 
a murderer can literally be a matter of life and death.  So, while it is true that 
the recanter—the later self who accurately, consistently, and steadfastly 
describes a different reality that is not extracted through coercion, 
 
 68 See Lackey, supra note 39, at 145 (developing idea that credibility becomes scarce); 
see also Jennifer Lackey, Pitted Against Yourself: Credibility and False Confessions, BLOG 
AM. PHIL. ASS’N (Apr. 21, 2016), https://blog.apaonline.org/2016/04/21/pitted-against-your
self-credibility-and-false-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/D75N-LCB7]. 
 69 While I have here focused on earlier-self credibility excesses, it should be clear that 
similar considerations apply to later selves. Suppose, for instance, that a false “memory” of 
abuse is coercively extracted by people in power to serve their purposes, and the testimony of 
this “later self” is given an excess of credibility in virtue of bias against her social identity. 
This would be an example of a later-self credibility excess, with a corresponding form of 
testimonial injustice. 
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manipulation, or deception—is wronged in being afforded a massive 
credibility deficit, there is a unique and powerful epistemic wrong done to 
the earlier self who receives a credibility excess.  Indeed, the excess given in 
false confessions quite literally amounts to the state saying that confessors 
are knowers with respect to the testimony in question only insofar as they are 
not epistemic agents.70 
There is an instructive parallel here: in ancient Athens, the testimony of 
enslaved persons, who were the property of their masters or the state, was 
typically inadmissible in judicial proceedings except under torture.  As 
Michael Gagarin writes, “One of the most criticized features of classical 
Athenian law is the bizarre institution of . . . ‘interrogation under torture.’  A 
well-known rule held that in most cases the testimony of slaves was only 
admissible in court if it had been taken under torture, and in the surviving 
forensic speeches the orators frequently . . . praise the practice as most 
effective.”71  Just as Athenian courts regarded the testimony of enslaved 
persons as reliable only when obtained via torture—and thus offered under 
conditions devoid of epistemic agency—so, too, do our courts privilege the 
testimony of confessing selves, even when confessions are extracted through 
interrogation techniques that undermine or compromise our epistemic 
agency.  This is especially problematic when the confessing selves are 
vulnerable members of society, such as juveniles and those with 
developmental impairments, and when the credibility excesses are fueled by 
prejudice, such as racism and sexism.72 
 
 70 See Lauren Leydon-Hardy, Predatory Grooming and Epistemic Infringement, in 
APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY (Jennifer Lackey ed., forthcoming 2020) (discussing a distinctive 
kind of epistemic wrong that targets the epistemic agency of knowers). 
 71 Michael Gagarin, The Torture of Slaves in Athenian Law, 91 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 1, 
1 (1996). 
 72 Similarly, Edward Peters discusses the legal revolution that took place in Europe in the 
twelfth century that shaped European criminal jurisprudence until the end of the eighteenth 
century. EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 41 (1985). One of the consequences of this legal 
revolution is that “confession was elevated to the top of the hierarchy of proofs, so elevated, 
in fact, that jurists called confessions ‘the queen of proofs.’” Id. Moreover, it is precisely 
because confessions were taken to be such compelling evidence of guilt, and torture was 
regarded as a reliable means of acquiring true confessions, that torture became so integrated 
into the European criminal justice system of this time. Peters writes: 
For all the uncertainties that attended the gathering and weighing of evidence, the testimony of 
witnesses, and the unpredictability of judges and juries, confession provided a remedy, and in 
some cases, chiefly capital ones, it came to be required. It is the importance of confession upon 
which hinges, if not the revival, then surely the spread and integration of torture into the legal 
systems of the thirteenth century. 
Id. at 44. 
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We might take a step back here, then, and identify an interestingly 
different sort of testimonial injustice, one that is grounded in unwarranted 
credibility excesses afforded to speakers when their epistemic agency has 
been denied or subverted in the obtaining of their testimony.  Let’s call the 
excess given in such cases non-agential, which can give rise to the 
corresponding agential testimonial injustice.  Agential testimonial injustice 
is extraordinarily vivid in cases of false confessions that have been extracted 
in various ways, but testimony obtained in ways that deny epistemic agency 
is not limited to such cases.  Many abusive relationships, for instance, involve 
coercion of various degrees, including in testimonial contexts, and when 
what is reported under such conditions is unjustifiably privileged, one is the 
victim of this kind of testimonial injustice.  Imagine, for instance, a woman 
testifying that her partner has never been abusive while he is sitting next to 
her in an interrogation room, but she then retracts this once she is able to 
extricate herself from his control.  If the former testimony is weighed far 
more heavily than the latter for no good reason, particularly when one is 
aware of the broader context of the abuse, this would be an instance of what 
I call agential testimonial injustice. 
It is worth developing in a bit more detail the precise nature of two 
different epistemic wrongs involved in this kind of testimonial injustice.  The 
first kind of wrong is the one highlighted above, which specifically involves 
the excess of credibility given to the extracted testimony.  Here, one is 
epistemically wronged by virtue of being regarded as a testifier—a giver of 
knowledge—only when one’s testimony is extracted and is thus the product 
of a process that subverts one’s epistemic agency.  This can be seen both by 
the weight that the confession is given relative to other evidence and, 
specifically, the privileging of the confessing testimony over the recanting 
testimony. 
The second kind of epistemic wrong involved in agential testimonial 
injustice results from the very act of extracting testimony from a speaker in 
a way that subverts her epistemic agency.  This can happen in different ways.  
The clearest and most extreme case is where the extraction, such as the 
interrogation tactics in question, leads subjects to believe in the truth of their 
own reports, either wholly or partially.  For instance, Saul Kassin and 
Lawrence Wrightsman characterize “coerced-internalized” false confessions 
as those in which “innocent but malleable suspects, told that there is 
incontrovertible evidence of their involvement, come not only to capitulate 
in their behavior but also to believe that they may have committed the crime 
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in question, sometimes confabulating false memories in the process.”73  In 
cases of coerced-internalized false confessions, then, both one’s testimony 
and one’s doxastic states have come under the will of another.  By virtue of 
employing techniques that are coercive, manipulative, and deceptive, 
interrogators here are able to alienate a suspect from her own epistemic 
resources and bring about beliefs that are disconnected from her epistemic 
agency.74 
These cases of coerced-internalized false confessions quite 
straightforwardly involve this second epistemic wrong.  To see this, notice 
that epistemic agency is commonly understood as requiring a subject’s 
responsiveness to reasons or evidence.75  On a strong reading of this, I 
exercise my epistemic agency with respect to my belief that p when my belief 
that p is responsive to reasons.  When interrogators are able to manipulate 
not only the testimony of suspects, but their doxastic states as well, they are 
quite clearly interfering with the reasons-responsiveness of the suspects’ 
beliefs.  This results in a clear instance of the second epistemic wrong 
involved in agential testimonial injustice since a subject’s epistemic agency 
is being subverted in the obtaining of her confession. 
But even when subjects don’t internalize their own guilt, and thus 
continue to believe in their innocence despite saying otherwise, there is an 
important sense in which their epistemic agency is compromised in the 
extraction of their testimony.  To make this clear, let’s look at a couple of 
cases where a speaker reports what she herself does not believe but in a way 
that does not at all interfere with her epistemic agency. 
Consider, first, lying—where a speaker states that p, believes that p is 
false, and states that p with the intention to be deceptive with respect to 
whether p.76  Even though a liar aims to be deceptive in her reports, this does 
not at all interfere with her ability to be responsive to reasons in her beliefs 
or her testimony.  Indeed, a liar might even be a responsible epistemic agent 
 
 73 Kassin et al., supra note 2, at 15; see also SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. 
WRIGHTSMAN, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOL. OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROC. 64 
(1985). 
 74 Coerced-internalized false confessions are an example of what Leydon-Hardy calls 
epistemic infringement. See Leydon-Hardy, supra note 70. 
 75 See e.g., Pamela Hieronymi, Responsibility for Believing, 161 SYNTHESE 357 (2008) 
(providing a reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility according to which 
voluntariness is not required for responsibility); Conor McHugh, Epistemic Responsibility and 
Doxastic Agency, 23 PHIL. ISSUES 132 (2013) (arguing that the central condition on 
responsibility is reasons-responsiveness and believers can satisfy this condition only because 
they are doxastic agents). 
 76 See Jennifer Lackey, Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce, 73 ANALYSIS 236, 237 
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regarding her doxastic states, despite the fact that her statements aim away 
from the truth.  Consider, next, cases of selfless assertion,77 where there are 
three components to this phenomenon: first, a subject, for purely non-
epistemic reasons, does not believe that p; second, despite this lack of belief, 
the subject is aware that p is very well supported by all of the available 
evidence; and, third, because of this, the subject asserts that p without 
believing that p.  A classic case of a selfless assertion is where a Creationist 
teacher correctly reports that Homo Sapiens evolved from Homo erectus to 
her students, even though she doesn’t believe this herself.  Here, the reported 
belief in question is resistant to counterevidence, and so the belief itself is at 
least not properly responsive to reasons.  Nevertheless, the reporting of the 
selfless assertion does not in any way violate the speaker’s epistemic agency 
and, in fact, is grounded in it.  In particular, the speaker in such cases fails to 
report what she herself believes, but she does so for straightforwardly 
epistemic reasons.  In this way, she is appropriately sensitive to reasons, not 
with respect to her own beliefs, but with respect to her testimony.  On my 
view, then, selfless assertions straightforwardly reflect epistemic agency. 
Let’s now turn to the case of extracted testimony.  For instance, Kassin 
discusses “compliant false confessions,” which are “those in which suspects 
are induced through interrogation to confess to a crime they did not commit.78  
“In these cases, the suspect acquiesces to the demand for a confession to 
escape a stressful situation, avoid punishment, or gain a promised or implied 
reward.”79  Here, even if the beliefs of the suspects are responsive to reasons, 
this is utterly disconnected from the obtaining of their testimony.  Unlike in 
the case of selfless assertions, for instance, where the offering of the reports 
is precisely what is grounded in the responsiveness to reasons, the tactics 
used to extract the confessions—coercion, manipulation, deception— 
subvert the epistemic agency of the suspects.  Thus, such speakers are the 
victim of this second kind of epistemic wrong involved in agential 
testimonial injustice. 
D. SOCIAL IDENTITY PREJUDICE 
Finally, recall that Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice focuses 
specifically on credibility deficits that result from prejudices targeting a 
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speaker’s social identity, such as race or gender.80  We might ask, then, what 
social identity is relevant in cases of false confessions, especially since it is 
not only members of underrepresented groups that are victims of the sort of 
credibility excess at issue in agential testimonial injustice.  By way of 
response, notice that Fricker’s conception of social identity is unnecessarily 
narrow.  While race and gender are certainly highly relevant to the credibility 
that speakers are given across many different contexts, there are other aspects 
of social identity that are important here as well, such as socioeconomic 
status, occupation, and so on.  For instance, many people in the workplace 
find themselves on a hierarchy where those at the top are given more 
credibility than those lower down, even in areas that are entirely disconnected 
from their areas of expertise.  In a hospital, physicians might be believed over 
nurses about questions that do not pertain to medicine, and if this happens 
regularly, and simply in virtue of professional status, it seems correct to say 
that the nurses are victims of testimonial injustice.  Similarly, members of 
groups associated with delinquency, deviance, or moral deficiency, such as 
“criminals,” “prisoners,” or even “suspects” are frequently the targets of 
systematic prejudice.  A criminal record, for instance, presents a major 
barrier to employment,81 the label of “prisoner” or “ex-con” is highly 
stigmatized,82 and offenders tend to be demonized as dangerous, dishonest, 
and disreputable.83  Moreover, Edwin Meese III famously said in 1985, while 
he was Attorney General of the United States, “you don’t have many suspects 
who are innocent of a crime. That’s contradictory. If a person is innocent of 
a crime, then he is not a suspect.” 84  Thus, a plausible explanation is that a 
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confession triggers in others the belief that the confessor is thereby a 
“criminal,” and this is at least one of the social identities targeted in cases of 
false confessions.  Of course, this can combine with other prejudices, such as 
those involving race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.  But even in the 
absence of these prejudices, confessions can lead to egregious acts of 
testimonial injustice. 
Agential testimonial injustice thus involves a testifier suffering two 
epistemic wrongs, both through the process by which the testimony is 
extracted and by virtue of the credibility excess it receives.  I now turn to 
why confessing selves might be given a credibility excess in the first place.  
And it is crucial to address this question, as convictions based largely on false 
confessions can’t be explained simply by pointing to the fact that recanting 
selves receive a credibility deficit.  In many cases, if you subtract the 
confession, you lose the conviction, too.85  So, for instance, even if a 
defendant’s testimony of innocence at a later time is rejected, what is often 
also needed to convince a jury of his guilt is the veracity of the original 
confession.  Put bluntly, calling the recanter a liar isn’t enough for a 
conviction—the confessor also needs to be regarded as a truthteller. 
IV. WHY ARE CONFESSIONS PRIVILEGED? 
The first, and perhaps most obvious, reason why the testimony of 
confessors is privileged is that most of us find it very difficult to imagine 
ourselves confessing to something we didn’t do and so we conclude that the 
suspect must be guilty.  This is especially compelling when a violent crime 
is at issue, such as murder.  The problem with this is that there is ample 
psychological research showing otherwise.  For instance, in a well-known 
experiment by Saul Kassin and Katherine Kiechel, 69% of college students 
who were falsely accused of causing a computer to crash by pressing a key 
that they were told to avoid signed a confession.86  When false evidence of 
guilt is presented, this percentage is even higher, and it is not uncommon for 
suspects to come to believe in their own guilt, either fully or partially.87  A 
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software to fabricate evidence of participants “stealing” money from a 
“bank” during a computerized gambling experiment.88  When presented with 
this evidence, all of the subjects signed the confession form, with 63% fully 
internalizing the act and 20% partially internalizing the act.89  The authors 
concluded that “a combination of social demand, phoney evidence and false 
suggestion from a credible source can lead a substantial number of people to 
falsely confess and believe they committed an act they never did.”90  This 
phenomenon can be seen in the case of Michael Crowe, whose sister was 
stabbed to death in her bedroom.91   
After a series of interrogation sessions, during which time police presented Crowe with 
compelling false physical evidence of his guilt, he concluded that he was a killer, 
saying: ‘I’m not sure how I did it. All I know is I did it.’ Eventually, he was convinced 
that he had a split personality—that ‘bad Michael’ acted out of a jealous rage while 
‘good Michael’ blocked the incident from memory. The charges against Crowe were 
later dropped when a drifter in the neighborhood that night was found with [his sister’s] 
blood on his clothing. 92 
Another reason we favor the confessor over the recanter is that false 
confessions affect the perceptions of others, including eyewitnesses, alibi 
witnesses, and forensic experts.  In one study, 61% of those who had 
witnessed a staged theft changed their identifications after learning that 
certain lineup members had confessed.93  In another study, only 45% of 
participants maintained their support of an alibi for a suspect after being told 
that she confessed to stealing money, a number that dropped to 20% when 
the experimenter suggested that their support might imply their complicity 
with the alibi.94  What this data shows is that false confessions not only 
mislead in the first instance, they also beget additional misleading evidence 
downstream.  When this is combined with how counterintuitive false 
confessions seem to many, including to judges and jurors, conditions become 
optimal for wrongful convictions. 
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Of particular relevance for our purposes here is that there is reason to 
believe that racial prejudice or bias is at work in convictions based on false 
confessions.  Andrew Taslitz explains what happens when the interrogation 
techniques we discussed earlier are used in conjunction with racial 
discrimination: 
Now when we add race to the mix, the picture becomes clearer. Officers start with a 
presumption of the guilt of a young black male based upon one-sided and limited 
circumstantial evidence. The kid reacts with hostility and defensiveness. These 
reactions, combined with his powerless speech patterns, lead police to believe he is 
lying. They close off alternative theories, heightening the pressure on the kid about 
whose guilt they are now convinced. They make real evidence sound more inculpatory 
than it is, they deceive him into believing there is still more inculpatory evidence 
against him, they appeal to his self-interest, and they hammer away at him for hours. 
Young, isolated, cut off from family and friends, fearful, and rightly seeing no way out, 
he confesses. Falsely. 
Should the youth take the stand at a suppression hearing, the judge, drawing on the 
same racially-stigmatizing images of black youth, won’t believe him. The case goes to 
trial, and the jury likely sees a film just of his confession . . . the same defensiveness 
and linguistic barriers that made the kid seem to be a liar to the police prod the jury 
toward a similar conclusion. And the same stereotypes of black criminality and 
duplicity again favor jurors accepting the truthfulness of the confession rather than of 
its retraction.95 
Given that 85% of juvenile exonerees who falsely confessed are African 
American,96 there is further reason to conclude that racism is a significant 
factor when looking at why confessing selves are given a credibility excess. 
Finally, the practical interests of those most responsible for securing 
justice often lead them, intentionally or unintentionally, to weigh confessions 
far too heavily, to disregard exculpatory evidence, and to rely on incredible 
theories to support their conclusions.  This is often seen in the case of 
prosecutors, who can be blindly driven by a desire to “win.”  For instance, in 
a widely ridiculed interview on an episode of 60 Minutes, “Chicago: The 
False Confessions Capital,” then State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez discussed 
the case of the “Dixmoor Five” in which DNA evidence ruled out five 
defendants who had falsely confessed to the rape and murder of a fourteen-
year-old girl.97  Moreover, the semen found inside the fourteen-year-old 
matched Willie Randolph, who was a convicted rapist with thirty-nine 
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arrests.  After serving a total of ninety-five years behind bars, all five were 
exonerated in 2011, and in 2013 the Illinois State Police settled a civil rights 
case brought on their behalf for a record $40 million.98  Despite all of this, 
when asked about this case in a 2015 interview, Alvarez still said that it was 
possible that the five defendants raped and murdered the girl, and that 
Randolph wandered past the field where her body was and committed an act 
of necrophilia.99  Since the total evidence overwhelmingly tells against this 
outrageous theory, the most plausible explanation is that Alvarez was 
motivated by her practical interests, which she thinks will be served by 
refusing to admit mistakes by her office.  Of course, we see this same 
phenomenon outside the courtroom as well.  Climate change deniers will 
massively privilege one scientist’s testimony over that of thousands of others 
because it suits their purposes, as do voters with the testimony of their 
preferred candidates for office.  When such credibility excesses are driven by 
prejudices, they clearly result in acts of testimonial injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have argued that false confessions provide a unique, 
compelling, and practically urgent case in which an excess in credibility 
results in a distinctive kind of testimonial injustice.  This reveals not only that 
credibility can, in fact, be finite, and that its proper distribution is often of 
critical importance—indeed, it can literally be the difference between life and 
death—but also that in privileging earlier, confessing selves over later, 
recanting selves, the state often reduces the confessor to a knower only 
insofar as she is devoid of epistemic agency.  In doing so, the state is quite 
straightforwardly saying to its citizens—you are worthy of being believed 
only when we undermine your epistemic agency and extract information 
from you through coercive or manipulative methods.  That this is a 
particularly pernicious form of testimonial injustice, carried out by 
institutions in which we place our trust, cries out for a radical change in the 
epistemic lens through which we view confessions in the criminal justice 
system. 
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